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Abstract
This work experimentally examines forecasting and trading behavior. Subjects play
the role of both analyst and shareholder over the course of experiments consisting of a
series of repeated games with or absent conflicts of interest. In a stylized trading setting,
I test whether standard equilibrium, normative behavior, or limited strategic reasoning
best predicts behavior. In the presence of conflicts of interest a substantial proportion
of subjects’ behavior appears non-skeptical in the role of shareholder, though the same
subject is deceptive in the role of analyst. Absent conflicts of interest, subjects behavior
in the role of shareholder is nearer a best response to the same subject’s behavior as
analyst. The results are consistent with limited strategic reasoning and suggest that
simply disclosing conflicts of interest does not evoke skepticism of forecasting, nor does
the elimination of conflicts of interest in itself induce honesty.
Keywords: conflicts of interest, truth-telling, cheap talk, communication game, ex-
periment
Data Availability: experimental data available from author on request
∗Telephone: 714.289.2092; E-mail address: shields@chapman.edu
1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
Sell-side analysts are compensated, at least in part, by brokerage commissions. The U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission cites brokerage commissions as a potential conflict of
interest, stating, “[An] analyst report can help firms make money indirectly by generating
more purchases and sales of covered securities—which, in turn, result in additional brokerage
commissions [Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008]. This suggests that forecasts that
move the market are possibly attractive to analysts.
In this work, I experimentally examine behavior in an institutional market setting. In this
setting, an analyst with private value-relevant information issues a forecast to shareholders.
The shareholders can then elect to trade; if there is trade, the analyst is paid a commission
in two conflict-of-interest experiments. In two other experiments, the analyst is paid a flat
fee if the shareholders trade or not.
The incentive created by brokerage commissions is an example of the economic tensions
modeled in communication games, sometimes also called cheap talk games [Crawford and
Sobel, 1982]. In analytical models of communication games, a sender with information
transmits a message to a receiver, who then takes an action that affects the payoffs of both
the sender and the receiver. If there are conflicts of interest in that the sender would prefer
the receiver to take an action other than the action that is best for the receiver, then not
all information can be credibly communicated. In equilibrium, the sender will not adopt a
truth-telling strategy and the receiver will be skeptical. As a result, the messages will at
best be partially informative and at worst completely uninformative. Several experimental
studies examining communication games show that senders of information do adopt deceptive
strategies when the interests of the receiver and sender diverge [Blume et al., 1998; Dickhaut
et al., 1995]. However, while subjects exhibit a willingness to deceive others in communication
games, a phenomenon of overcommunication is documented: senders reveal more information
than analytical theory predicts, and receivers rely more on the sent information [Cai and
Wang, 2006; Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz, 2007; Wang et al., 2009].
Experimental studies examining communication games posit that the overcommunication
can be explained by the existence of types of subjects. Both Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz
[2007] and Hurkens and Kartik [2009] posit that observed behavior could be explained by
the existence of two types of subjects: those who behave akin to equilibrium prediction
and maximize payoffs and those who subscribe to social norms of honesty. While these
studies examine behavior in one-shot communication games, where the sender and receiver
are grouped together one time, the presence of honest types may prevent the repeated game
from reducing to a series of one-shot games and allows for reputation building as a sender
seeking to maximize profits may elect to mimic an honest type.
A related but alternative explanation of the overcommunication phenomenon is that sub-
jects fail to sufficiently reason. Rather than the possibly endless iterations needed to arrive
at equilibrium (I know that you that I know that you know that I know. . . ), a nonequilib-
rium theory of levels of reasoning assumes that subjects seek to maximize payoffs but fail to
reason sufficiently, yielding a static and possibly erroneous belief of others’ strategies. In a
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communication game, this theory would predict some subjects who are deceptive if playing
the role of sender but at the same time non-skeptical in the role of receiver.
In this work, I examine behavior in an institutional market setting to distinguish behavior
from the prior experiments of communication games conducted in a context-neutral setting. I
have the analyst and shareholders play a repeated game for a set number of rounds. After the
set, subjects are regrouped and roles are reassigned. In this way, I can measure a subject’s
behavior both in the role of analyst and in the role of shareholder. Within the stylized
setting, I ask what best explains overall subject behavior: standard equilibrium prediction,
the existence of types following social norms, or models of limited reasoning?
Other accounting experiments examine behavior of subjects who disclose (akin to ana-
lysts) to other subjects who interpret the disclosure (akin to shareholders) in the presence of
conflicts of interest [Dickhaut et al., 2003; Hobson and Kachelmeier, 2005; King and Wallin,
1991]. They find that senders have a propensity to disclose strategically to maximize payoffs
and that receivers exhibit some skepticism. In this work, I too find that overall, analysts
behave deceptively in the conflict-of-interest experiments; however, I find that overall, share-
holders are not sufficiently skeptical. Most enlighteningly, I find many examples of subjects
who are deceptive in the role of analyst but non-skeptical in the role of shareholder. As such,
a subject’s behavior in the role of shareholder is inconsistent with his own behavior in the
role of analyst. The experimental behavior is consistent with limited levels of reasoning.
When examining experiments in which the conflicts of interest are removed, where the
analyst has no reason to lie but also no reason to tell the truth, I find that analysts are
not significantly more likely to forecast their private information, although their behavior
appears more erratic than in the experiments with conflicts of interest. Shareholders appear
economically better off in the absence of conflicts of interest. Subjects behavior in the role
of shareholder is more consistent with their behavior in the role of analyst. Together, the
findings suggest that behavior in the market setting is not coherent with standard equilibrium
predictions, but it does appear that the majority of subjects act in their own best interest
rather than following ethical dilemma, analogous to the findings of Rankin et al. [2008]
examining disclosure in a budget setting. Instead, behavior appears consistent with models
of allowing for limited strategic reasoning. The implication is that simply removing conflicts
of interest may not result in a behavior following social norms.
Section 2 describes the experimental setting, followed by predictions based on standard
equilibrium, the existence of types, and levels of strategic reasoning. Section 3 describes the
experimental procedures. Section 4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes.
2 The Setting and Predictions
I start by describing the repeated game used in all four experiments. First, I describe
a setting with conflicts of interest between the analyst and shareholders. In this setting,
the analyst can only earn commissions if the two shareholders trade. Thereafter I discuss
an alternative game absent the conflicts of interest. Then I describe standard equilibrium
behavior and discuss similar but competing theories of behavior and denote the resulting
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hypotheses. Throughout the work, I will refer to the analyst as “she” and the shareholder
as “he.” All prices, costs, and payoffs are expressed in the experimental monetary unit lira.
2.1 The Experimental Game
I design an experimental setting to capture elements in the analyst and shareholder rela-
tionship. A single analyst is paired with two shareholders. To induce trade one shareholder
must be willing to sell and the other willing to buy. The payoffs are constructed to provide
potential gains to trade. Each shareholder acts simultaneously as both seller and buyer to
mitigate promotion of directed behavior. The game is repeated a finite number of times to
provide the analyst an opportunity to develop a reputation.
2.1.1 Conflict-of-Interest Experiments
An analyst and two shareholders play a repeated game. Each three-person base game consists
of the following stages:
1. Two shareholders are endowed with a unit of a financial asset, and an analyst is given
a private signal of the state of nature.
2. The analyst releases her forecast of the state of nature to shareholders.
3. A market opens such that one shareholder can sell his asset to the other. The analyst
earns a commission that is contingent on the shareholders agreeing to trade.
4. The asset is liquidated. The liquidation amounts are a function of the state of nature
and the asset owner.
To understand the fundamental tension in the game, I start by describing the fourth
stage. In the last stage of the game, the state of nature is drawn from the set {A,B,C,D},
and shares are liquidated. The ex-ante value of each share is identical. The shareholders
have different payoffs from the liquidated shares, a proxy for shareholders having different
preferences or facing different tax rates. While the difference in payoffs is symmetrical, the
payoffs are asymmetrical and provide potential gains to trade. The payoffs and differences
in payoffs are shown in Table 1a.
In stage 1, the analyst receives a private signal regarding the state of nature. The
private signal, s ∈ {A˜, B˜, C˜, D˜}, is uniformly distributed. There is a 90% probability that
the realized state will equal the private signal. The signal has limited support in that the
realized state will be an element of the set {A,B} when the signal is either A˜ or B˜, and the
realized state will be an element of the set {C,D} when the signal is either C˜ or D˜ (see Table
1b). The signal structure, state, and signal distributions are common knowledge, whereas
the realization of the analyst’s signal is private to the analyst.
In the second stage, the analyst releases a message, f ∈ {Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, Dˆ}. If the realization of
the private signal, s, is an element of {A˜, B˜}, the analyst can release a forecast of either Aˆ or
Bˆ. Likewise, if s ∈ {C˜, D˜}, the analyst can release a forecast of either Cˆ or Dˆ. The reporting
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technology is common knowledge, so after the forecast is released, shareholders know that
the state is in either {A,B} or {C,D}. The setting with moving support allows the most
parsimonious structure to investigate behavior in the presence of conflicts of interest.
In the third stage, a market opens and the shareholders can trade. If there is trade, a
shareholder buys the other’s share at a transfer price P , selected from a menu of prices, and
when there is trade, the buyer pays trading costs λ. Shareholder 1 is restricted to buying or
retaining his share when the state is A or B and to selling or retaining this share when the
state is C or D. A symmetric restriction is placed on shareholder 2.
In the first of two experiments with conflicts of interest, labeled “low-cost,” λ is only the
13-lira commission paid to the analyst. In the second experiment, labeled “high-cost,” λ is
21 lira and includes 9 lira in deadweight costs in addition to the 13-lira commission. Each
shareholder retains his endowment if there is no trade; if there is no trade, the analyst earns
nothing. The trading costs exceed the difference in payoffs in states B and C. The gains to
trading jointly available to shareholders are shown in Table 1c.
Insert Table 1 here
Four trading prices are presented, as follows: P1, 7 lira; P2, 23 lira; P3, 83 lira; and
P4, 91 lira. If the shareholders believe that the analyst is forecasting honestly, then P1
and P4 are the feasible prices when the forecast is Aˆ and Dˆ, respectively. P1 and P4 are
parameterized to split the expected gains to trade equally between the two shareholders,
given that the analyst reports honestly and shareholders trade for forecasts Aˆ and Dˆ. In the
low-cost experiment, if the two shareholders believe that the analyst is reporting deceptively,
then P2 and P3 are the feasible prices when the forecast is an element of {Aˆ, Bˆ} or {Cˆ, Dˆ},
respectively. P2 and P3 are parameterized to split the expected gains to trade equally
between shareholders given that the analyst reports deceptively and shareholders always
trade. In the high-cost experiment, no price is feasible when both shareholders believe that
the analyst is deceptively forecasting. Ex post payoffs for all trading scenarios are shown in
Tables 3a and 3b.
2.1.2 No Conflict-of-Interest Experiments
The game differs in two additional experiments. As in the conflict-of-interest experiments,
an analyst and two shareholders play a repeated three-stage game. However, the analyst
earns a fixed payoff independent of whether shareholders trade. Consequently, the analyst
has no economic reason not to reveal her private signal.
In the first of two experiments absent conflicts of interest, labeled “no-budget,” all payoff
amounts mirror the low-cost experiment; that is, the analyst and shareholder payoffs and
costs are the same, but the contingent structure of analyst payoffs is removed. The share-
holder’s ex post payoffs are shown in Table 2a. The analyst’s private signal is governed by
Table 2c. Restrictions on what report can be sent and whether the shareholder can act as
buyer and seller are maintained. The trading costs are 13 lira, and the analyst’s fixed payoff
is 13 lira.
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Though this experiment is comparable to the low-cost experiment, the setting violates
budget balancing. Analysts are not paid out of realized gains to trade. As such, the parties
benefiting from the analyst’s private information are not directly funding the analyst. As
such, the setting is politically awkward and would likely prove difficult to implement. From
a social engineering perspective, it might be more palatable if those who benefited from
private information paid for it.
In a second experiment lacking conflicts of interest, labeled “no-commission,” I alter
payoffs such that shareholders indirectly fund the analyst’s payoff. The analyst is paid 4
lira every game, mirroring the average analyst payoff in the high-cost experiment (13 lira
commission times the likelihood of trade). Shareholder 1’s ex post payoff decreases 4 lira in
states A and B, and shareholder 2’s ex post payoff decreases 4 lira in states C and D (see
Table 2b). The changes in payoffs are analogous to an institution taxing and redistributing
resources. Trading costs are 9 lira and paid by the buyer if there is trade.
While the gross payoffs differ for shareholders, the gains to trade are identical in both no-
conflict-of-interest experiments as in the low-cost experiment. In the no-budget experiment,
a trading cost of 13 lira is subtracted from the difference in payoffs shown in Table 2a to
arrive at gains to trading available to shareholders. In the no-commission experiment, the
trading cost of 9 lira is subtracted from the difference in payoffs shown in Table 2b to arrive
at the same gains to trading, both shown in Table 2d.
Insert Table 2 here
Prices P1 through P4 are set to the same values as in the conflict-of-interest experiments.
P1 and P4 are feasible if the shareholders belief that the analyst reports honestly, and P2
and P3 are feasible when the shareholder believes that the analyst reports deceptively. Ex
post payoffs for all trading scenarios are shown in Tables 3c and 3d.
Insert Table 3 here
2.2 Predictions
In this section I discuss the standard equilibrium for all experiments. This discussion illus-
trates the effects of conflicts of interest and thus provides insight into alternative theories
of behavior. Research examining similar communication games finds that senders (ana-
lysts) reveal more information than predicted by standard equilibrium theory and that re-
ceivers (shareholders) rely more on the sent information than predicted [Cai and Wang,
2006; Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz, 2007; Wang et al., 2009]. Additionally research in the
area of financial markets has provided empirical evidence that financial analysts exaggerate
recommendations. Michaely and Womack [1999] attribute this documented bias to conflicts
of interest between the analysts and investors, citing both brokerage commissions and the
investment banking business as possible sources. Both Malmendier and Shanthikumar [2007]
and Franco et al. [2007] find evidence of differences in the reaction of investors, suggesting
that some investors, the smaller investors, are misled by deceptive recommendations despite
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the disclosure of conflicts of interest. Given the experimental and archival findings, I look to
alternative behavioral arguments from experimental economics and psychology.
The next set of predictions is constructed assuming that agents are heterogeneous or have
a belief of population heterogeneity. Some agents follow socially normative behavior, whereas
others seek to maximize their profits yielding predictions of behavior based on types. The
last set of predictions assumes that agents are self-interested but do not iterate indefinitely
in assessing best responses to others, but instead reason up to some number of steps. As
such, these predictions differ from equilibrium as agents do reason sufficiently to arrive at
equilibrium. This yields predictions based on various levels of reasoning.
2.2.1 Equilibrium Predictions
The equilibrium is constructed assuming that both the analyst and the shareholder are
sequentially rational. Sequential rationality requires that the analyst’s actions and beliefs
be optimal and correct, respectively, given the shareholder’s actions and beliefs.
Equilibrium Predictions Given Conflicts of Interest
Due to the inherent conflicts of interest created by trade-based commission payments,
analysts adopt deceptive forecasting strategies, but shareholders are never duped as share-
holders anticipate deception and all forecasts are interpreted with skepticism. Within this
equilibrium scenario, though information is lost, shareholders are not deceived.
The standard equilibrium is constructed via backward induction. Start with the last
period and imagine, to the contrary, that the analyst reveals her private signal via the
forecast. In other words, the analyst adopts honest forecasting. In this case, the difference
between the shareholders expected values are shown in Table 4a; the difference exceeds
trading costs λ (of 13 or 21 lira) only in states A and D. Consequently, there is trade 50%
of the time, when the forecast is Aˆ or Dˆ, at prices P1 and P4, respectively.
Given the contingent nature of the commission, an analyst would desire the shareholders
to trade. As such, the analyst does not want to credibly communicate that the state is likely
B or C. It follows that the forecasting analyst cannot reveal her private information in all
cases, and she adopts a deceptive forecasting strategy. Anticipating deception, shareholders
are skeptical of the forecast. As a result, the information content of the forecast is limited
to the reporting restrictions; a forecast of Aˆ or Bˆ only conveys that the state is either A or
B with equal likelihood and not C or D. Conversely, a forecast of Cˆ or Dˆ only conveys that
the state is either C or D and not A or B. We are at the equilibrium prediction: analysts
destroy information content and shareholders are skeptical of forecasts. If shareholders fail
to anticipate deception and continue to trade at prices P1 and P4, then on average trade
benefits shareholder 1 at the expense of shareholder 2. Shareholder 2 will sell at P1 while the
average value of 20 lira is higher. Likewise, shareholder 2 will buy at P4 and incur trading
costs but the average value of 100 lira is lower.
Insert Table 4 here
Skeptical shareholders hold the expected payoff values shown in Table 4b. In the low-cost
experiment, the difference between the two shareholders’ expected values (20 lira) exceeds
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trading costs of 13 lira. Risk-neutral shareholders will trade for all forecasts released at prices
P2 for forecasts Aˆ or Bˆ and at prices P3 for forecasts Cˆ or Dˆ. In the high-cost experiment
where trading costs are 21 lira (13 lira commission plus 9 lira in deadweight costs), trading
costs exceed the difference between expected values of appropriately skeptical shareholders.
As such, shareholders will not trade.
Hypothesis 1. In the presence of conflicts of interest, subjects will be deceptive in the role
of analyst and skeptical in the role of shareholder.
Equilibrium Absent Conflicts of Interest
The conflicts of interest are eliminated when the analyst’s payoff is independent of the
shareholders trade. Interests are not aligned, but there is no economic conflict between an-
alyst and shareholders. Absent invoking a tie-breaking rule, there is no unique equilibrium
prediction. The analyst may reveal her private signal, or she may elect to destroy infor-
mation. If the shareholders believe that the analyst is forecasting honestly, their expected
payoffs are shown in Table 4a. As such, trade occurs half the time at prices P1 or P4, when
the analyst releases a forecast of Aˆ or Dˆ, respectively. However, if the shareholders believe
that the analyst is forecasting deceptively, their expected payoffs are shown in Table 4b, and
trade occurs all the time at prices P2 and P3.
2.2.2 Type-Based Predictions
Experimental research examining communication games posits that the overcommunication
can be explained by the existence of types of subjects. Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz [2007]
experimentally examines a communication game, followed by a punishment stage. The
experiment differs from this work as the subjects are paired together for one round, there
are conflicts of interest between the the pair in all states of nature, and most importantly,
the communication game is followed by a punishment costly phase where the receiver can
reduce both parties payoffs to zero after seeing the realized state. Hurkens and Kartik [2009]
examines Gneezy [2005] communication experiment where a subjects are paired and play one
round and only the sender (akin to analyst) is told the ex-post payoffs. Both Sa´nchez-Page´s
and Vorsatz [2007] and Hurkens and Kartik [2009] posit that the experimental results can
be explained by two types of subjects: those who behave akin to equilibrium prediction and
maximize payoffs and those who subscribe to social norms of honesty. This supposition may
lead to behavior described by H. L. Mencken: “It is hard to believe that a man is telling
the truth when you know that you would lie if you were in his place.” Following this logic,
subjects will act consistent with their own actions. If a subject is deceptive in the role of
analyst, that subject is skeptical of analysts in the role of shareholder. If the subject is honest
in the role of analyst, that subject is non-skeptical of analysts in the role of shareholder.
Hypothesis 2. Subjects will demonstrate behavior in the role of shareholder that is consistent
with their own behavior in the role of analyst.
Sobel [1985] analyzes a finitely repeated information transmission game in which the
sender, analogous to the analyst in this work, has preferences that are aligned with the
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receiver or that differ; that is, the sender may be one of two types. The uncertainty as to
the sender’s type prevents the repeated game from reducing to a series of one-shot games
as providing honest information in the setting increases the sender’s reputation but comes
at a cost to the strategic type, who cannot mislead the receiver too quickly, thus revealing
her type, but nonetheless will eventually attempt to deceive the receiver. The prediction is
similar to the analytical research of Kreps and Wilson [1982] and Kreps et al. [1982], where
agents are predicted to develop a reputation for being one type. Experimental research
examining Centipede games [McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992], repeated lending games [Camerer
and Weigelt, 1998], and repeated trust games [Dickhaut et al., 2008] provides evidence that
some subjects attempt to develop a reputation for being a certain type.
Imagine that some fraction of analysts is honest, characterized as analysts who send
truthful messages in all rounds of the repeated game. Shareholders have a prior belief of
this fraction. Other analysts use this fact to deceive potentially skeptical shareholders in
a repeated game. A strategic analyst might elect to mimic the honest type in potentially
all but the last round of a repeated game as revealing herself as deceptive would trigger
shareholder skepticism and thus no commissions in future rounds. As such, the anticipation
of detection can temper deceptive forecasting as shareholders will be skeptical of an analyst
caught using a deceptive strategy. The consequences of skepticism are a function of trading
costs. If costs are large enough, as in the high-cost experiment, then skeptical shareholders
cannot agree on a price and do not trade. If trading costs are small enough, as in the low-cost
experiment, then skeptical shareholders can expect to capture gains trading despite deceptive
forecasting. The opportunity to develop a reputation yields the following predictions.
Hypothesis 3. In the presence of a conflict of interest, analysts will initially adopt honest
strategies and switch to deceptive strategies over a set of repeated one-shot games.
Hypothesis 4. Analyst behavior will be more honest in the high-cost than in the low-cost
experiment as the analyst has an incentive to develop a reputation for being honest.
Hypothesis 5. Shareholders will become skeptical after witnessing deception.
2.2.3 Levels of Strategic Reasoning
Rubinstein [2006] examines thousands of unpaid responses to a version of the Traveler’s
Dilemma laid out by Basu [1994] and finds evidence of some subjects playing na¨ıvely and
other subjects responding as if others play na¨ıvely. This structured heterogeneity is captured
in models of strategic reasoning, capturing the idea that humans exhibit several distinct
modes of behavior. Predictions based on differing levels of strategic reasoning are constructed
on a nonstrategic base-level strategy. Each subsequent level of the hierarchy is a type defined
as the best response, assuming that other players use a lower level of strategic reasoning.
Experiment tests of models based on limited reasoning often outpredict the predictions
derived in equilibrium models [Camerer et al., 2004; Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1994].
To illustrate, I use a guessing game from Nagel [1995] in which each player is asked to
choose a number from 0 to 100. The winner of the game is the player who chooses a number
2 THE SETTING AND PREDICTIONS 9
that is one-half the mean of all other players’ choices. The prize is given to the winner,
and all others receive nothing. If there is a tie, the prize is split equally between winners.
The predicted Nash equilibrium is that all players choose zero. Using the levels of reasoning
hierarchy, define the level-0 nonstrategic type as choosing uniformly over 0 to 100. Then the
level-1 type’s best response is to choose 25 (one-half of 50). The level-2-type best response
is to choose 12.5, and so on. Nagel [1995] examines the experimental results of the guessing
game and finds subjects’ responses between level 1 and level 2. This finding is replicated by
Ho et al. [1998], who examine a broader assortment of guessing games.
Examining communication games, Crawford [2003] cites early experimental evidence
[Blume et al., 1998] and argues that the system of types should be anchored on the honest
sender who preserves information content and the non-skeptical receiver who believes the
message has information content. In this work, I also anchor my hierarchy on honest forecast-
ing and non-skeptical trading. In the role of analyst, the nonstrategic type literally reveals
private information in the released forecast. In the role of shareholder, the nonstrategic type
garners information out of the forecast released.
Consider the presence of conflicts of interest between the analyst and shareholder. The
subsequent level-1 type is a best response to others being honest and non-skeptical. As
a result, the level-l type is deceptive as an analyst, attempting to mislead shareholders.
However, the level-1 type is non-skeptical as a shareholder as level-0 types are honest as
analysts. Consequently, the level-2 type is also deceptive as an analyst, attempting to
mislead level-1 shareholders. As a shareholder, the level-2 type is skeptical as the level-1
types are deceptive as analysts. The actions of subsequent types are identical to level-2 and
correspond to equilibrium predictions: analysts are deceptive and shareholders are skeptical.
This hierarchy yields a unique prediction: a level-1 type that appears rational in the role
of analyst but irrational in the role of shareholder. While this prediction appears at odds
with the intuition inherent in the Mencken quote, the prediction mirrors the experimental
findings of Cain et al. [2005]. The authors find that in the presence of a disclosed conflict
of interest, senders tend to strategically bias their messages, and receivers generally do not
sufficiently discount advice from senders.
Prominent experimental researchers suggest that these nonequilibrium models predict
behavior in new or novel situations, and eventually, equilibrium behavior will emerge. As
such, it is argued that the hierarchical model does not supplant standard equilibrium predic-
tions but can be seen as a path to equilibrium. It is an open question as to whether subjects’
behavior will be predicted by higher levels as this repeated game progresses. For example,
Nagel finds limited reasoning even in repeated games. Other research examining deception
and conflicts of interest does not find that subjects recognize deception sufficiently despite
evidence of deception [Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978; Wilson and Brekke, 1994].
Given the phenomenon of overcommunication found in experimental strategic transmis-
sion games, I conjecture that there will be some proportion of the population that behaves as
level-0. This conjecture, coined with the aforementioned experimental findings that overall
behavior was explained by level-1 to level-2 thinking, suggests that there will some propor-
tion of each of the aforementioned levels observed in experiments with a conflict of interest.
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As such, while subjects’ behavior is heterogeneous, overall, analysts will behave deceptively,
but shareholders will behave trustingly.
Hypothesis 6. In the presence of conflicts of interest, analysts will tend to be deceptive and
shareholders will tend to be non-skeptical.
Now consider the absence of conflicts of interest between the analyst and shareholder.
The subsequent level-1 prediction is a best response to the other being honest and non-
skeptical. As before, the level-1 type is non-skeptical as a shareholder as level-0 types are
honest as analysts. However, her actions as analyst are irrelevant to her payoff. Though she
has no reason not to tell the truth, she also has no reason to tell the truth. Thus either
being honest or not are both best responses. By the same argument, as a shareholder, the
level-2 type can either be honest or not in the role of analyst. As a shareholder, the level-2
type is characterized as skeptical as his ex ante perception of the level-1 analyst is that she
will play randomly.
Insert Table 5 here
Within this framework, level-1 behavior, characterized as a best response to level-0 be-
havior, may be observationally indistinguishable from level-0 behavior if the level-1 analyst
elects to be honest. Additionally, in the absence of conflicts of interest, level-2 behavior may
be honest in the role of analyst but skeptical in the role of shareholder: a combination of
behavior excluded in the presence of conflicts of interest.
Examining ‘hide-and-seek’ games, Crawford and Iriberri [2007] consider that defining
alternative behavior for the level-0 type may to alternate hierarchical models and/or dis-
tribution of types. By similar argument, the salience of the level-0 behavior might lead to
a different proportion of types. Assuming that proportions of each level are relatively the
same as in the experiments with conflicts of interest, I should see relatively more honest
analyst behavior and equivalent non-skeptical behavior compared to the experiments with
conflicts of interest. What if disclosure of conflicts of interest invokes images of normative
or professional behavior in the eyes of shareholders, as suggested by Cain et al. [2005]? If
so, then in the conflict-of-interest experiments, subject behavior is explained by an anchor-
ing on the level-0 type. When removing the conflict of interest, this anchoring weakens
and strategic reasoning increases, leading to a higher proportion using level-2 reasoning. A
higher proportion predicts more honest analyst behavior but at the same time more skep-
tical shareholder behavior. The conjecture that higher levels will predict behavior in the
no-conflicts-of-interest experiment yields the following prediction.
Hypothesis 7. In the absence of conflicts of interest, analysts will tend to be honest, and
shareholders will tend to be skeptical.
3 Experimental Methods
The Centre for Interuniversity Research and Analysis of Organizations [2009, hereinafter
CIRANO] ran experimental sessions in Montreal, Canada. Subjects are recruited by CIRANO
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using recruitment software [Greiner, 2004] from a standard subject pool consisting mainly
of university students. Subjects remain anonymous to the author. Each session consisted of
12 subjects and no subject participated in more than one session.
Subjects interact with each other anonymously over a local computer network. The ex-
periment is programmed and run using z-Tree software specifically designed for economic
experiments [Fischbacher, 2007]. The computers are placed in such a way that all subjects
can only view their own computer screens. Each experiment lasted approximately two hours,
and the sequence is summarized subsequently. In all experiments, subjects are told the struc-
ture of the sender’s private information, the forecasting mechanism, trading costs, and all
potential payoffs for all roles. As such, subjects are aware of the presence, or absence, of con-
flicts of interest between analysts and shareholders. An ex ante quiz confirms that subjects
understand the information structures, payoffs, and forecasting and trading mechanisms.
3.1 Experimental Sequence
The experimental sequence proceeds as follows:
1. An experimenter reads the instructions aloud while each subject follows along with his
or her own copy of the instructions (see supplementary materials for example of instruc-
tions). The instructions explain the experimental procedures, information structures,
and payoffs used in the experiment. While going over the instructions, the experiment
asks subjects to write down their answers to several questions to ensure that they
understand the experiment. Subjects’ answers remain confidential. The experimenter
reviews the correct answers. After and while the instructions are read, subjects are
prompted to ask the experimenter if they have any questions regarding the experimen-
tal procedures.
2. Each subject is randomly and anonymously grouped into an economy with two other
subjects. The identities of members within the economy are not revealed to any subject.
An analyst is randomly selected within each economy, and others are assigned the role
of shareholder, each owning a stock that pays a dividend.
3. The analyst inputs her reporting strategy for each possible value of her private signal.
Meanwhile, the shareholders enter their trading strategies for each possible value of
the analyst’s forecast. Each subject has one minute to enter his or her decision. If the
analyst fails to enter a decision, the computer uses her last input decision, or, if in the
first round of the set, randomly determines the reporting strategy. If the analyst fails
to make a decision, no commission is paid regardless of trade.1 If the shareholder fails
to enter a decision, the computer assigns a strategy of no trade, and the shareholder
keeps his endowment.
1No subject playing the role of analyst failed to enter her decision within this time frame. This rule is in
place in all experiments.
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4. Using the input strategies, the computer draws ten realizations of the analyst’s private
signal and nature for each economy. The feedback is private to the three grouped
subjects within the economy. A summary screen shows subjects the feedback, including
their own payoff, of the ten realizations.
5. The preceding two steps constitute a round. Each economy of three subjects plays
together for eight rounds.
6. Subjects are regrouped into new economies, as described earlier. Subjects are notified
of the regrouping and acknowledge by clicking with a mouse.
7. Each subject is paid a ten Canadian dollar participation fee and the payoffs of ten
randomly drawn realizations from the 64 rounds. One Canadian dollar is paid for
every 15 lira earned. The average pay per subject is 37 Canadian dollars.
8. Each subject signs and dates a payment receipt form and receives payment.
3.2 Grouping, Rounds, and Sets
Within each experiment, an economy is defined as a grouping of one analyst and two share-
holders. During each round, all subjects within the economy play the base game. The
economy remains intact for a set of eight rounds. The economies are private from another as
the results from one economy do not affect payoffs in other economies, and the information
within an economy is not available to subjects outside the economy. After a set of eight
rounds, subjects are regrouped and roles are reassigned. The repeated interaction enables
a platform for reputation building and revised beliefs of others strategies. Reassigning roles
enables examination of a subject’s behavior in one role versus behavior in another.
3.3 Capturing Subjects Choices
I use the strategy method for eliciting choices from subjects. Following this method, subjects
state contingent choices for every decision node they may face. This differs from a game in
which a subject makes a decision at realized nodes. Comparisons of the strategy and realized
node methods reported little difference in subject choices [Brandts and Charness, 2000; Cason
and Mui, 1998; Oxoby and McLeish, 2004]. Subjects who play the role of analyst enter their
reporting strategy before seeing a realization of the private signal; that is, for all possible
values of the private signal, the analyst makes a binary choice: to reveal her signal truthfully
or not (see Figures 1 through 3 in the supplementary materials for captures of the input
screen). Meanwhile, subjects playing the role of shareholder enter their trading decisions,
electing to buy, sell, or hold for each possible forecast value.
3.4 Providing Feedback
After subjects enter their decisions, the computer draws a realization of the state and private
signal. Using the reporting strategy input by the analyst and realization, the computer
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determines the analyst’s forecast from her input strategy. Using the shareholders’ input
trading strategies, the computer determines if there is trade for the released forecast. If the
shareholders agree to trade at both the high and low price (high bid and low ask), then the
lower price is used.
If the ask exceeds the bid or either shareholder 1 or shareholder 2 elects not to trade, the
shareholders keep their endowed shares. Using the state and agreed on price, the computer
determines the shareholders’ and analyst’s payoffs. The computer draws ten such realizations
and reports the feedback in a summary table (see Figure 4 in the supplementary materials).
The summary table included all realizations for all rounds played to date within the economy.
This provides a rich history so that subjects can revise beliefs on others’ strategies. Using
the summary report, a subject can partially infer other subjects’ strategies used in prior
rounds of the current set. The shareholders’ trading strategies are explicitly displayed for
all forecasts released, but the analyst’s strategy can only be inferred from the number of
times the forecast released is not identical to the realized state. Knowing the analyst’s signal
structure, shareholders can in theory calculate the posterior likelihood that the analyst used
an honest or deceptive forecasting strategy. Overall, if there is more than one mismatch of
the forecast and realized state, it was more likely that the analyst used a deceptive forecasting
strategy than an honest one.
4 Results
I begin with construction-dependent variables measuring subject behavior in the role of ana-
lyst and in the role of shareholder. These variables, measuring compliance with equilibrium
predictions of deception and skepticism, are averaged over each subject in each experiment.
The average subject behavior allows for tests of hypotheses based on equilibrium, the exis-
tence of types, and levels of strategic reasoning.
4.1 Behavior Classification
In every set, the subject is randomly assigned one of three roles. As such, not all subjects
play each role the same number of times. Indeed, in one experiment, a subject never played
the role of analyst. All other subjects played both roles, resulting in at least 8 choices in the
role of analyst and 16 choices in the role of shareholder.
For each round, subjects’ choices are classified into one of two types. The elicited fore-
casting choice is classified as honest or deceptive, and the elicited trading choice is classified
as skeptical or non-skeptical.
4.1.1 Analyst Choice Classification
Each round, analysts choices are classified as either honest or deceptive, as follows:
Honest The analyst reveals her private signal in the message, forecasting Aˆ when the signal
is A˜, Bˆ when the signal is B˜, and so forth.
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Deceptive The analyst does not choose to reveal her private signal for all possible values,
destroying information.
Of the analysts’ input choices classified as deceptive, in the conflict-of-interest experiments,
nearly 60% elected to exaggerate a moderate signal of B˜ or C˜ and forecast Aˆ or Dˆ accordingly,
and fewer than 10% were invertible, forecasting Bˆ when seeing A, Aˆ when seeing B, and
so forth. In no-conflict-of-interest experiments, only about 26% elected to exaggerate a
moderate signal of B˜ or C˜ and forecast Aˆ or Dˆ accordingly, and nearly 25% were invertible,
forecasting Bˆ when seeing A˜, Aˆ when seeing B˜, and so forth.
4.1.2 Shareholder Choice Classification
A skeptical shareholder, anticipating deceptive forecasting, would recognize that there is
limited information content in the analyst’s forecast. For example, a forecast of Aˆ or Bˆ
would be informationally equivalent, informing the shareholder that the state could not be
C or D. Each round, the shareholder choice is classified as either skeptical or non-skeptical,
defined as follows:
Skeptical The shareholder inputs one bid/ask for both forecasts Aˆ and Bˆ and another
bid/ask for both forecasts Cˆ and Dˆ. This includes a shareholder electing not to trade
for every forecast.
Non-skeptical The shareholder does not input a skeptical trading choice, but instead inputs
bids/asks as if there is information content in the forecast.
The later classification does not require that bids/asks are monotonic in the forecast.
However, only four observations of the 1,170 choices classified as non-skeptical had a higher
bid/ask for Bˆ than for Aˆ and a higher bid/ask for Cˆ than for Dˆ. Fewer than 10% had a
higher bid/ask for Bˆ than for Aˆ or a higher bid/ask for Cˆ than for Dˆ. Accordingly, this
coding captures subjects who tried to extract information content from the forecast. The
frequencies of each subjects elicited choices are shown in Table 6.
Insert Table 6 here
4.1.3 Performance in Experimental Groupings
To gain further insight into subjects behavior, I construct metrics of trade, welfare, and
forecasting in each grouping of analysts and shareholders and report the average over the
eight-round set. The metric illuminates the joint choices of subjects in the grouping and
is not dependent on rules to classify behavior. Owing to state uncertainty, each metric is
the property of subjects’ elicited choices and not of the random realizations displayed in the
subjects summary report (see Appendix A for the construction). The metrics are shown in
Table 7.
Insert Table 7 here
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4.2 Tests of Hypotheses
For all hypothesis tests, I use the average response for each participant over the experiment
in each role. In this way, I obtain 12 independent observations for each experiment.2 Unless
stated otherwise, I perform the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank or Mann-Whitney U
tests on these observations.
4.2.1 Equilibrium-Based Predictions
Hypothesis 1 is that subjects in the conflict-of-interest treatments behave deceptively in the
role of analyst and skeptically in the role of shareholder. The equilibrium prediction is that
the shareholders will always trade in the low-cost experiment but never in the high-cost
experiment. In the low-cost treatment, the expected benefit of trading is equal between
shareholders. The average behavior reported in Table 6 (Panel A) suggests that on average,
analysts were deceptive but shareholders were not skeptical. The expected trade metric shows
that the average trade is similar, being lower in the low-cost treatments. Last, shareholder
1 benefited more from trade than did shareholder 2, suggesting that trade occurs at prices
P1 and P4 when the state was C or D.
In summary, it does not appear that allowing for a repeated game in the trading setting
resulted in an elimination of the overcommunication phenomenon witnessed in communica-
tion games. This impression is confirmed by statistical analysis, as the p value that behavior
in both roles is the same is less than .01 and .04 for the low-cost and high-cost experiment,
respectively.
4.2.2 Type-Based Predictions
Hypothesis 2 posits that subjects’ behavior in the role of receiver is consistent with their
own role of receiver. The average behavior reported suggests that this is not always the
case. While in all experiments, there are subjects primarily honest in the role of analyst
and primarily non-skeptical in the role of shareholder (albeit less in the conflict-of-interest
experiments), and subjects primarily deceptive in the role of analyst and primarily skeptical
in the role of shareholder, there are quite a few exceptions. In all experiments, there are
subjects who are primarily deceptive in the role of analyst but primarily non-skeptical in the
role of shareholder. Only in the experiments absent conflicts of interest are there subjects
primarily honest in the role of analyst and primarily skeptical in the role of shareholder.
As such, it does not appear that behavior measured across both roles is consistent with
hypothesis 2 in the conflict-of-interest experiments. For the conflict-of-interest experiments,
the p-value that behavior in both roles is the same is less than .01 and .04 for the low-cost
and high-cost experiment, respectively.
In the absence of conflict-of-interest experiments, the average behaviors in the role of
analyst and the role of shareholder are closer. While the overall difference between average
behaviors shown in Table 6 is 25.0% to 31.8% in the presence of conflicts of interest, the
2Eleven for analyst behavior in the no-commission experiment.
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overall difference is drastically less in the absence of conflicts of interest, where the difference
is 0.9% to 13.7%. This impression is confirmed by statistical analysis, as the p-value that
behavior in both roles is the same is less than .22 and .99 in the no-budget and no-commission
experiment, respectively.
Can the behavior be explained by reputation formation? Examining the averages in
Table 6 reveals many subjects who did not consistently use the same classified behavior.
However, there are subjects who chose to be consistently honest in the role of analyst. It
may be that other subjects are strategically mimicking honest analysts and later switching
to deceptive strategies. In response, shareholders may be initially non-skeptical but become
skeptical after witnessing deception. The sender choices are examined in each round of the
set to determine if there is support for hypothesis 3. If strategic analysts are mimicking
honest analysts to gain a reputation for being honest, deceptive forecasting should be lower
in the first rounds of the set, when the analyst is attempting to form a reputation, and then
higher in the later rounds of the set. Figure 1 shows the mean of the average deception for
each player for each round. There does not appear to be a clear trend. This is statistically
examined by looking at each subject’s forecasting behavior in the first and last rounds of the
set, testing the difference between the average in the first round and the average in the last
round. Testing the null hypothesis that the behavior is the same in the first and last round
of a set yields p-values of .157, .063, .88, and .94 for the high-cost, low-cost, no-budget,
and no-commission experiment, respectively.3 In the high-cost experiment, the average first-
round behavior is less deceptive than the average last-round behavior, albeit it is statistically
insignificant at the 5% level. In the low-cost experiment, the average first-round behavior is
more deceptive than the average last-round behavior but is again statistically insignificant
at the 5% level.
Include Figure 1 here
Only in the high-cost experiment is there theoretical benefit to forming a reputation,
resulting in hypothesis 4 that there will be more honest forecasting in the high-cost than in
the low-cost experiment. While the average analyst behavior is less deceptive in the high-cost
than in the low-cost experiment, this difference is only 3.0%. Statistically, the difference is
insignificant as the p-value of the corresponding Mann-Whitney U test is .90. However, the
manner of deception appears different when comparing experiments. There was over twice
the proportion of exaggeration in the conflict-of-interest experiments compared to the no-
conflict-of-interest experiments, suggesting that the analyst most often attempted to deceive
shareholders in the conflict-of-interest experiments compared to reporting haphazardly in
the experiments absent conflicts of interest.
In addition to finding no support for hypotheses 3 and 4, I find no support for hypoth-
esis 5. To test for evidence of a reaction to deceptive forecasting, I examine the average
shareholder choices before and after the analyst first elects to issue a deceptive forecast in
a set of eight rounds. The choices before deception include the round deception occurs as
3The test is also run comparing the first four rounds to the last four rounds of a set for each subject and
yields comparable results.
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shareholders do not receive feedback until after their bids/asks. By construction, this metric
excludes bids/asks in sets in which the analyst was honest in the first seven rounds of a
set. Despite the exclusion, all shareholders experienced a deceptive forecast at least once. I
test the average choices before and after encountering deceptive forecasts. The mean of the
subjects’ averages is shown in Figure 2 for each experiment. Only in the no-budget experi-
ment does overall skepticism increase after the analyst used a deceptive forecast, albeit the
difference is not statistically significant at the 5% level. Statistical testing uses each subject
as observation. Testing the null hypothesis that the skepticism is the same before and after
encountering deception yields p-values of .127, .065, .41, and .85 for the high-cost, low-cost,
no-budget, and no-commission experiment, respectively.
To ensure that the classification is not failing to capture skepticism, a similar test is also
run calculated using the proportion of each shareholder’s bids/asks containing the prices
P1 and P4. Note that this proportion is independent of any classification rule. In all
experiments, the prices P1 and P4 are only consistent with the belief that the analyst is
honest. In all but the high-cost treatment, the mean of the average proportions decreases,
but the difference is about 1% to 2% (such as 36% of all bids down to 34% of all bids).
Testing against the null hypothesis that the frequency of bids/asks containing prices P1 and
P4 are the same before and after encountering deception yields p-values of .99, .24, .23, and
.34 for the high-cost, low-cost, no-budget, and no-commission experiment, respectively.
Include Figure 2 here
In summary, I do not find support for the notion that subjects are one of two types. I
do not find that behavior in each role is steadily honest/non-skeptical or deceptive/skeptical
in the repeated game. Furthermore, I do not find evidence that subjects are strategically
mimicking types to maximize payoffs.
4.2.3 Levels of Strategic Reasoning Predictions
Reviewing Table 6 for the conflict-of-interest experiments reveals that there are subjects
generally honest in the role of analyst and non-skeptical in the role of shareholder, subjects
generally deceptive in the role of analyst and skeptical in the role of shareholder, and generally
deceptive in the role of analyst but non-skeptical in the role of shareholder. Note that there
are not any subjects generally honest in the role of analyst and skeptical in the role of
shareholder. This composition mirrors the types shown in Table 5a, where there is the
absence of a predicted type behaving honest as an analyst and skeptical as a shareholder.
To provide statistical support for hypothesis 6, I perform a permutation test on the mean
difference of the behavior in Table 6 for subjects in the conflict-of-interest experiments. The
null hypothesis that behavior is the same in both roles is identical. If the null hypothesis is
true, a permutation within any pair of scores is as likely as the reverse. This yields 4,096
permutations of the observed data (212). The results of the test are graphed in Figures 3a
and 3b. The one-sided p-values are less than .01 for both experiments, providing support
for hypothesis 6.
5 CONCLUSION 18
Behavior is more interchangeable in the experiments absent conflicts of interest. The
same aforementioned permutation tests examining the differences in behavior in the role of
analyst and the role of shareholder are insignificant at the 5% significance level. The results
of the test are graphed in Figures 3c and 3d. The one-sided p-values are .087 and .37 for
the no-budget and no-commission experiment, respectively.4 Unlike the conflict-of-interest
experiments there are subjects acting primarily honestly in the role of analyst and primarily
skeptical in the role of shareholder.
Insert Figure 3 here
Hypothesis 7 posits that analysts will be more honest and shareholders more skeptical
in the no-conflict-of-interest experiments. The behavior shown in Table 6 shows that the
average analyst behavior is more honest in the no-conflict-of-interest experiments shown in
the bottom panel than in conflict-of-interest experiments shown in the top panel, albeit the
difference is slight. Shareholders appear more skeptical in the no-conflict-of-interest exper-
iments than in the conflict-of-interest experiments. As such, there does not appear to be
overwhelming support for hypothesis 7. The interpretation is corroborated by statistical
analysis showing no significant differences in behavior at the 5% level. I compare the av-
erage analyst behavior for the 24 subjects in the conflict-of-interest experiments to the 23
subjects in the no-conflict-of-interest experiments. Testing the analyst data using a Monte
Carlo permutation test of 20,000 observations yields insignificance corresponding to a p-value
of .12. Testing average shareholder behavior for the 24 subjects in the conflict-of-interest
experiments to the 24 subjects in the no-conflict-of-interest experiments using a Monte Carlo
permutation test of 20,000 observations also yields insignificance corresponding to a p-value
of .066.5 As such, I fail to find evidence for hypothesis 7.
5 Conclusion
This study examines the behavior of a group of subjects with conflicts of interest in a
moderately complex communication game set within a trading institution. In keeping with
prior work, senders (analysts) send more information than predicted by equilibrium models
assuming sequentially rational agents. Likewise, receivers (shareholders) rely on information
sent more than predicted. In this work, I do not conclude that some proportion of subjects
following normative social behavior explains the observed overcommunication phenomenon.
Overall, subjects’ behavior is more analogous to models of limited reasoning. Though less
than half the subjects chose to use honest forecasting strategies in the presence of conflicts
of interest, more than half chose to use non-skeptical trading strategies. This pattern is
consistent with predictions of limited strategic reasoning: when playing the role of sender,
4There are 11 paired observations in the no-commission experiment as one subject (#44) was never
randomly assigned the role of analyst. This yields 2,048 permutations.
5It was not computationally possible to test all 23!12!11! possible permutations of analyst behavior and all
24!
12!12! possible permutations of shareholder behavior.
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a subject assumes that others are habitually non-skeptical and thus adopts a deceptive
forecasting strategy. When playing the role of shareholder, the subject assumes that others
are habitually honest and thus adopts a non-skeptical strategy.
The disclosure of the conflicts of interest between analysts and shareholders was not
sufficient to evoke shareholder skepticism. In all experiments, shareholders do not appear
to sufficiently change behavior after encountering deception in analysts’ forecasts, consistent
with psychological work. Taken together, the results suggest that subjects are inclined to seek
out information content despite the presence of deception. Unexpectedly, disclosure of the
conflicts of interest between analysts and shareholders was not sufficient to evoke shareholder
skepticism. Ironically, the disclosed conflicts of interest did not appear to invoke any more
skepticism than in the experiments absent conflicts of interest. The resulting reliance is
similar to work by Cain et al. [2005] suggesting that disclosure of conflicts of interest might
invoke images of normative or professional behavior in the eyes of shareholders and at the
same time might strategically influence analysts to deceive shareholders.
Eliminating commissions might theoretically induce honesty and trust, but the experi-
mental results suggest that this may not be the case. Though some might posit that the
elimination of brokerage commissions, as the SEC barred brokerage firms from tying analysts
compensation to investments in specific banking transactions, the elimination of conflicts of
interest between parties may not induce honesty and trust. Despite the observed deception,
eliminating brokerage commissions did increase shareholder welfare as the shareholders were
more likely to capture trading gains.
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A Metrics of Trade
Metrics for trade, capturing gains to trade, and benefits of trading are constructed, rather
than relying on the random realizations generated during the experiment (as described in
section 3.4). These metrics are free of any stochastic noise inherent in the realizations.
Parameters for the states, signals, and probabilities thereof are described in section 2.
A.1 Likelihood of Trade
The likelihood of trade is derived from subjects’ input reporting and trading decisions. This
metric captures to what extent subjects’ input decisions prompted trade between the share-
holders. This metric was defined for a round in a single economy:∑
States
∑
Signals
Pr(state)Pr(signal|state)If (signal).
If (signal) is an indicator function, defined in every round for the three subjects within
a single economy. The function equals 1 if there is trade for the released message f and 0
otherwise. There is trade if the input bid for the released message is greater than or equal
to the input asking price for the released message. The message released is the result of
the analyst’s input reporting strategy for the given signal. This metric is agnostic as to the
distribution of wealth and is akin to a social welfare metric.
A.2 Likelihood of Shareholders Capturing Gains to Trade
The likelihood of capturing gains to trade captures to what extent trade occurred when the
state was A or D. Not all trade benefited shareholders as a whole; rather, shareholders were
only benefited by trade in states in which gains to trade exceeded trading costs. This metric
is also defined in every round in a single economy, but whereas the prior metric was summed
over all states, this metric is summed over states A and D:
∑
{A,D}
Pr(state)
∑
Signals
Pr(signal|state)If (signal)∑
{A,D}
Pr(state)
.
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A.3 Benefit of Trading
Though trade benefited the economy as a whole, it was possible for trade to benefit one
shareholder at the expense of another. The benefit of trade was calculated for each share-
holder in an economy given the subjects’ input reporting and trading decisions. It captures
to what extent the shareholders were better electing to trade, given simply keeping their
original endowments. This metric was defined for a round in a single economy and is defined
separately for each shareholder:
shareholder 1 ∑
States
∑
Signals
Pr(signal|state)If (signal)Istate
{
T (f)− v1(state) + 1− Istate
2
λ
}
shareholder 2 ∑
States
∑
Signals
Pr(signal|state)If (signal)Istate
{
v2(state)− T (f)− 1− Istate
2
λ
}
.
Istate is an indicator function capturing the direction of trade. The indicator is −1 if the
state is A or B and 1 otherwise. T (f) is the transfer price: the minimum of the input bid
and input ask for the released report f . Both v1(.) and v2(.) are the payoffs to shareholder 1
and 2, respectively, given the state. The payoffs and the costs of trading, λ, are experiment
parameters described in section 2.
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Table 1: Experimental Parameters for Conflict-of-Interest Experiments
(a) Shareholder State-Based Payoffsa
State A B C D
Payoff to shareholder 1 30 50 70 90
Payoff to shareholder 2 0 40 80 120
Difference 30 10 10 30
(b) Chances of State Given Analyst’s Private Signalb
Signal observed A˜ B˜ C˜ D˜
Probability state A .9 .1
Probability state B .1 .9
Probability state C .9 .1
Probability state D .1 .9
(c) Shareholder’s Net Gains to Tradingc
State A B C D
Net gains in low-cost experiment 17 −3 −3 17
Net gains in high-cost experiment 9 −11 −11 9
aPayoffs paid to shareholder for each share held. Payoffs dependent on realized state.
bAnalyst’s signal structure governing imprecise analyst information.
cEx post net gains after subtracting trading costs of 13 lira and 21 lira in the low-cost and high-cost
experiments respectively.
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Table 2: Experimental Parameters for No-Conflict-of-Interest Experiments
(a) Shareholder State-Based Payoffs For No-Budget Experimenta
State A B C D
Payoff to shareholder 1 30 50 70 90
Payoff to shareholder 2 0 40 80 120
Difference 30 10 10 30
(b) Shareholder State-Based Payoffs For No-Commission Experimenta
State A B C D
Payoff to shareholder 1 26 46 70 90
Payoff to shareholder 2 0 40 76 116
Difference 26 6 6 26
(c) Chances of State Given Analyst’s Private Signalb
Signal observed A˜ B˜ C˜ D˜
Probability state A .9 .1
Probability state B .1 .9
Probability state C .9 .1
Probability state D .1 .9
(d) Shareholder’s Gains to Tradingc
State A B C D
Difference in payoffs for no-budget experiment(i) 30 10 10 30
Difference in payoffs for no-commission experiment(ii) 26 6 6 26
Net gains to trading (for both experiments) 17 -3 -3 17
aPayoffs paid to shareholder for each share held. Payoffs dependent on realized state.
bAnalyst’s signal structure governing imprecise analyst information.
cTrading costs paid by the buyer are subtracted from difference in payoffs to arrive at gains to
trading. Trading costs are (i) 13 lira and (ii) 9 lira in the no-budget and no-commission experiments,
respectively.
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Table 4: Shareholders’ Expected Payoffs
(a) Assuming Honest Forecasting
Forecast Aˆ Bˆ Dˆ Dˆ
Expected payoff to shareholder 1 32 48 72 88
Expected payoff to shareholder 2 4 36 84 116
Difference 28 12 12 28
(b) Assuming Deceptive Forecasting
Forecast Aˆ or Bˆ Cˆ or Dˆ
Expected payoff to shareholder 1 40 80
Expected payoff to shareholder 2 20 100
Difference 20 20
The shareholders’ expected payoff given the imprecision in the analysts private information assum-
ing that the analyst is honestly revealing her private information or adopting deceptive forecasting.
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Table 5: Types in Levels of Reasoning Framework
(a) In the Presence of Conflicts of Interest
Type Behavior as analyst Behavior as shareholder
Level-0 honest non-skeptical
Level-1 deceptive non-skeptical
Level-2 deceptive skeptical
(b) In the Absence of Conflicts of Interest
Type Behavior as analyst Behavior as shareholder
Level-0 honest non-skeptical
Level-1 honest or deceptive non-skeptical
Level-2 honest or deceptive skeptical
Predictions based on differing levels of strategic reasoning are constructed on a nonstrategic
base-level strategy. Each subsequent level of the hierarchy is defined as the best response assuming
that other players use a lower level of strategic reasoning.
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Figure 1: Proportion of deceptive forecasts per round.
Figure 2: Proportion of skeptical bids/asks.
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Table 6: Overall Behavior in All Experiments
High-cost experiment Low-cost experiment
Subject Deceptivea (%) Skepticala (%) Subject Deceptivea (%) Skepticala (%)
#1 50.0 35.4 #13 66.7 27.5
#2 91.7 25.0 #14 62.5 14.6
#3 56.3 31.3 #15 81.3 45.8
#4 70.8 50.0 #16 100.0 42.5
#5 0.0 16.7 #17 75.0 46.4
#6 91.7 60.0 #18 87.5 42.9
#7 93.8 35.4 #19 50.0 22.9
#8 87.5 37.5 #20 68.8 62.5
#9 12.5 41.1 #21 35.0 16.7
#10 100.0 15.6 #22 56.3 12.5
#11 18.8 25.0 #23 41.7 30.0
#12 50.0 50.0 #24 33.3 12.5
Average 60.2 35.2 63.2 31.4
Panel A: Conflict-of-interest experiments
No-budget experiment Budget-balance experiment
Subject Deceptivea (%) Skepticala (%) Subject Deceptivea (%) Skepticala (%)
#25 100.0 33.9 #37 0.0 42.9
#26 75.0 6.3 #38 84.4 71.9
#27 0.0 16.1 #39 83.3 77.5
#28 93.8 70.8 #40 93.8 18.8
#29 20.0 41.7 #41 37.5 67.5
#30 0.0 3.1 #42 0.0 53.6
#31 85.0 45.8 #43 25.0 45.8
#32 37.5 60.7 #44 NA 71.9
#33 50.0 33.3 #45 56.3 47.9
#34 0.0 20.8 #46 22.5 4.2
#35 43.8 33.3 #47 75.0 47.9
#36 95.8 70.0 #48 35.0 20.8
Average 50.1 36.3 46.6 47.5
Panel B: No conflict-of-interest experiments
aPercentage of time subject used deceptive forecasting and skeptical trading decisions.
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Figure 3: Difference of the Means
(a) High-cost experiment (b) Low-cost experiment
(c) No-budget experiment (d) No-commission experiment
The distribution for mean difference for the permutations formed using the paired data in Table
6 for each experiment. The dashed line denotes the observed difference between behavior in the
role of analyst and shareholder and the bell curve the normal distribution using the permutation’s
average and variance.
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